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FAIR AND IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATION
Thomas W Merrill*

INTRODUCTION

Any legal system that purports to respect the rule of law must ensure the
fair and impartial adjudication of disputes under the law. Classic accounts of
the rule of law assume that courts should resolve such disputes.I However,
this is too narrow. All forms of adjudication, not just by courts, need to be
fair and impartial. In any event, no one could claim that courts or entities by
that name are always fair and impartial. All legal systems need a guarantee
of fair and impartial adjudication that applies to all forms of dispute resolution under law.
A dispute arising under law is a claim by one individual or entity that
another individual or entity has acted in a manner contrary to law. Most commonly, such disputes revolve around historical facts. For example, A claims
B did something that, if true, means B acted contrary to law; and B denies
that he did what A claims. Sometimes adjudicators must resolve conflicting
claims about the applicable law. And sometimes they must resolve both the
facts and the law. Disputes arising under law often pit one private person or
entity against another. Other times they involve a dispute between the government and a private person or entity. The difficulty of ensuring fair and
impartial adjudication is greatest in this latter context, when the government
squares off against some nongovernmental person or entity.
The U.S. Constitution contains two strategies for securing fair and impartial adjudication. One is reflected in Article III; the other is found in the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part I of this
Article describes these constitutional strategies and explains how each was
originally envisioned as securing fair and impartial adjudication of disputes
under law. Part II describes how each strategy, over time, has failed to provide a general guarantee of fair and impartial adjudication. Part III concludes
with some tentative thoughts about restorative measures that might correct,
at least to some degree, the deficiencies that have emerged in assuring fair
and impartial adjudication over time.

Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School.
E.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 114 (8th

ed., Liberty Fund 1982) (1915).
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Two CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES

The U.S. Constitution contains two strategies for securing fair and impartial adjudication of disputes under law. The first strategy, which this Article labels the "Independent Adjudicator" model, is reflected in Article III.
The second strategy, which this Article calls the "Common Law Procedures"
model, is embodied in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The Independent AdjudicatorModel

A.

Article III vests the "judicial Power" of the federal government in a system of federal courts. 2 Repudiating colonial practice, in which judges served
at the pleasure of the king,' Article III stipulates that all federal judges, once
appointed, "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." 4 This has been understood,
from the beginning, to mean that federal judges can serve for life, subject
only to removal by impeachment, and as long as they serve, they cannot have
their pay reduced., What these protections were designed to accomplish, and
what they largely have accomplished, is the creation of a system of adjudication that enjoys a very high degree of independence from the political
branches-the Congress and the President.
How does the Independent Adjudicator model work to ensure fair and
impartial adjudication? The answer rests on a combination of what Article
III expressly provides and what it does not provide. It expressly provides that
federal judges, once appointed, are immune from direct oversight or influence by the political branches in how they decide disputes that arise under
law. What it does not provide is any authority for federal judges to enforce
the judgments they reach in resolving those disputes. This silence about enforcement authority was understood, from the beginning, to mean that Article
III judges would be dependent on the executive to enforce their judgments

2

U.S. CONST. art III,

§ 1.
3 On the colonial background, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERiCAN REVOLUTION 105-07 (1967); Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary:The ColonialBackground, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1104-11 (1976).
4 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
5 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 83-86 (1996).
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and thus, indirectly, on Congress to provide sufficient funding to the executive to enforce their judgments.6
The importance of insulating Article III judges from direct political influence is the more familiar half of the strategy. As Alexander Hamilton
wrote in The FederalistNo. 78, judicial independence is necessary in order
"to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from ... dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in
the community." 7 Yet if Article III did no more than create a body of judges
unaccountable to the political process, this would raise something of the opposite concern-the prospect of appointing "a bevy of Platonic Guardians"
that would rule society in the name of its own vision of the good.' Hamilton
was anxious to assure his audience that this would not happen. He emphasized that the federal judiciary would be "beyond comparison the weakest of
the three departments of power." 9 It would have "no influence over either the
sword or the purse" and thus would exercise "neither FORCE nor WILL, but
merely judgment.""o Indeed, he specifically noted the less familiar point
about what Article III does not provide: the judicial branch it created "must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
its judgments.""
Extrapolating a bit, Hamilton was arguing that a body of judges which
enjoys complete independence from the political branches in rendering judgments, but complete dependence on the political branches in enforcing its
judgments, will necessarily exercise "judgment" as opposed to "will" in deciding disputes that come before it. In modem terminology, Article III judges
would naturally gravitate to a strategy of resolving disputes in a manner that
is regarded as fair and impartial.
Hamilton did not spell out why a combination of independence-in-judging with dependence-in-enforcing would produce fair and impartial adjudication. Perhaps the explanation would go something like this: if adjudicators

6 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 566(c)
(2012)) (creating an executive office of United States Marshal, with one marshal in every judicial district,
and charging the marshal with enforcing judicial orders).
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
8 See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 73 (1958)
("For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how
to choose them, which I assuredly do not."). Judge Richard Posner once wrote that judicial independence
encourages the exercise of political power by judges, both by insulating "judges from retribution by the
overtly political branches and by influencing the selection process in favor of politically well connected
lawyers, many of whom have tastes and skills for functioning as political judges." RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 19 (1985). The passage was omitted from the second edition
of the book. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, at xiv (2d ed.

.

1996).
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 7.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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are insulated from direct political pressure in how they decide individual
cases, they will eschew favoritism toward politically favored parties or hostility toward politically disfavored ones. One can say they will resolve factual
questions in the disputes that come before them in a manner that is impartial.
At the same time, if adjudicators know they are ultimately dependent on the
political branches for enforcement of their judgments, they will not stray very
far, certainly not on a consistent basis, from settled expectations about the
decisional norms that they must use in assessing the conduct of the parties
that come before them. They will adopt, one can say, legal principles that are
generally understood to be fair.12
The framers of the Constitution did not invent the Independent Adjudicator strategy out of whole cloth. The model they had in mind was the British
judiciary, as it emerged after the Glorious Revolution-a model that was
widely regarded as having been denied to the American colonies in the years
before the Revolution.I But they made the strategy more explicit, and Hamilton went a long way towards explaining why it would secure fair and impartial adjudication.
One interesting aspect of the Independent Adjudicator model, certainly
as it is reflected in Article III, is that it says nothing about the proceduresthat
will be applied in resolving the disputes that come before the independent
adjudicators. The Constitution implicitly leaves procedures up to Congress
to adopt by law, or in default of action by Congress, for the adjudicators to
adopt on their own initiative.1 4 The intuition here seems to be that as long as
the adjudicator is truly independent, and is constrained by the lack of enforcement power to interpret the law in a manner that conforms to settled expectations, the exact mix of procedures used in resolving disputes under law is a
detail that can be allowed to evolve over time in light of experience. For example, the manner in which parties receive notice of complaints or motions
filed by opposing parties can change as the technology of distributing information changes.
The great strength of the Independent Adjudicator model is that it relies
exclusively on two highly formal, constitutionally enshrined conditions: The
adjudicator must have life tenure and secure compensation but no independent authority to enforce its judgments. These conditions are not something
that will be open to dispute on an ongoing basis. The institutional arrangements for appointing and sustaining a body of adjudicators will either meet
these conditions or not. Moreover, once these institutional conditions are
met, successive legislatures and adjudicators can work out all other issues
about the procedures that must be followed in adjudication, in the light of
12

Cf Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch:Executive Powerto Say What the Law

Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 246-52 (1994) (interpreting Hamilton as arguing that the federal courts will exercise
restraint in interpreting the law because of their dependence on the executive to enforce their judgments).
13 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 157-59 (2008); Smith, supra note 3, at 1144.

14 See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1825) (reasoning that federal courts have
authority to adopt rules for their own governance absent legislation on the subject by Congress).
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experience. Thus, if the model works in producing fair and impartial adjudication, it will do so in a largely self-regulating manner that allows for considerable flexibility in adopting different procedural formats in different contexts, and for experimenting with procedural innovations.
B.

The Common Law ProceduresModel

The second model for assuring fair and impartial adjudication is contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, later extended to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. In contrast to the Independent Adjudicator model, which has always been understood to entail the twin conditions of independence in adjudicating and dependence in enforcing judgments, the exact mandate reflected in the Due Process Clauses has long been
a matter of controversy. One controversy is whether the Clauses are addressed solely to procedures, as suggested by the words "due process of law,"
or whether they also secure a set of substantive entitlements.1 Another point
of contention is whether the Clauses apply only to executive and judicial actors, enjoining them to enforce the procedures laid down by the "law of the
land," or whether they also constrain legislatures to adopt procedures consistent with some independent normative conception of what procedures are
"due" in any particular context. 16
This Article will not add to the already extensive literature on these debates. Instead, it will start with the original understanding of due process as
it applies in the procedural context. Here, it is reasonably clear, "due process
of law" meant the process followed by courts at common law." The right of
due process meant one had the right to a common-law trial, typically a trial
by jury, before one's life, liberty, or property could be taken by the state. 15
This understanding prevailed at least until the end of the nineteenth century.19
Indeed, the common-law trial continues to this day to provide the paradigm
of the procedural package thought best to ensure a fair and impartial adjudication of a dispute arising under law.
A good illustration of the use of the Common Law Procedures model is
the 1970 decision in Goldberg v. Kelly. 20 In delineating the procedures required by due process in the context of an administrative decision to
15

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance andDue Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 86-90.

16 See id. at 95-100.
17

See generallyEdward J. Eberle, ProceduralDue Process: The OriginalUnderstanding,4 CONST.

COMMENT 339 (1987).
18

Id.

19

As stated in one influential nineteenth century decision, due process of law "mean[s] that no

person shall be deprived, by any form of legislation or governmental action, of either life, liberty or property, except as the consequence of some judicial proceeding, appropriately and legally conducted."

Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 434 (1856).
20 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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terminate welfare benefits, the Court held that the beneficiary must be afforded the following list of procedures: (1) "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination;" (2) "an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses"; (3) an opportunity orally to present his or her own evidence and argument; (4) the right to retain a lawyer
for representation; (5) the right to a statement of reasons for the decision limited to evidence adduced at the hearing; and (6) a decision by an impartial
decision maker, in the sense of a person other than the employee who made
the charging decision. 21 One can see from this list that the Court has abstracted from what it regards as the core or essential elements of a commonlaw bench trial. The proceeding must be adversarial, with claims and evidence provided by one party, and counterargument and evidence by the other;
lawyers and lawyerly methods like cross-examination are key instruments
for uncovering the truth; the adjudicator must base his or her decision on the
record adduced at the hearing; and the adjudicator must provide a statement
of supporting reasons for the decision.
The Common Law Procedures model seeks to ensure fair and impartial
adjudication by starting with a historical model assumed to have achieved
fair and impartial adjudication: the common-law trial, as it had evolved by
late eighteenth century. It then reasons that one can abstract the core or essential features of this model, and impose them as a matter of constitutional
law on contemporary forms of adjudication. The model assumes that if contemporary forms of adjudication comport with these essential procedural elements, one can be confident that they will provide fair and impartial adjudication.
In effect, the Common Law Procedures model adopts a strategy for assuring fair and impartial adjudication roughly the opposite of the Independent
Adjudicator model. The Independent Adjudicator model mandates a particular institutional design for a body of adjudicators-a combination of independence in deciding and dependence in enforcing-and assumes that if
these design conditions are met, there is no need to mandate any particular
package of procedures that the adjudicator must follow. The Common Law
Procedures model ignores the question of institutional design, at least along
the dimensions of independence and dependence of the body of adjudicators,
but insists that the adjudicator adhere to a particular package of procedures
in rendering its decisions.
Note that to one limited extent, the Common Law Procedures model
seems to overlap with the Independent Adjudicator model. At least as explicated in Goldberg, the Common Law Procedures model requires an "impartial" adjudicator. 2 2 But an impartial adjudicator, as required by the Common
21

Id. at 267-71.

22

Id at 271. See generally Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence

and the Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (examining what procedures are

necessary to preserve judicial independence).

2019]

FAIR AND IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATION

903

Law Procedures model, is not the same as an independent adjudicator, as
mandated by the Independent Adjudicator model. An impartial adjudicator,
as understood by the Common Law procedures model, is one who is free of
bias toward one of the parties. 23 An independent adjudicator, under the Independent Adjudicator model, is one who is free of political control by the other
branches of government. 2 4 Both elements are directed at aspects of the identity of the adjudicator, to the end of increasing the odds that the adjudicator
will reach fair and impartial judgments. But the Independent Adjudicator
model demands a permanent condition of insulation from political pressure.
The Common Law Procedures model, in contrast, requires only absence of
bias in individual cases.
The great strength of the Common Law Procedures model is its wide
application. Unlike the Independent Adjudicator model, which applies only
to adjudication by federal courts, the Common Law Procedures model applies to state courts, military tribunals, administrative agencies, and any other
entity authorized to resolve disputes that arise under law. Its implicit premise
is that by transplanting the model of the common-law trial to these diverse
contexts, fair and impartial adjudication can be secured in contexts extending
far beyond the limited domain of the Article III judiciary.
II.

Two MODELS OF FAILURE

Neither the Independent Adjudicator model nor the Common Law Procedures model has succeeded in providing a comprehensive guarantee of fair
and impartial adjudication in the United States. This is partly because of the
limitations in the constitutional provisions themselves and partly because of
changes in the scope of government and in the practice of adjudication that
have occurred since the respective provisions were adopted.
A.

The Limited Domain of the IndependentAdjudicator Model

The Independent Adjudicator model has always been confined to one
institution: the federal courts. As such, it has failed to provide a comprehensive solution to the need to assure fair and impartial adjudication of disputes
under the law. Unlike the Common Law Procedures model, the Independent
Adjudicator model does not extend to state court judges. Nor does it extend
to military tribunals, bankruptcy judges, magistrate judges, administrative
law judges, prosecutors, caseworkers, arbitrators, or any other persons who
perform functions that can be described as adjudication under law. To some
extent this failure was built into Article III. But it has also been exacerbated

23

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876-77 (2009).

24

See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text.
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by judicial rulings that have reduced the potential scope of Article III's application.
In one crucial respect, the failure to universalize the Independent Adjudicator model was inevitable. When the Constitution was adopted, it was impossible to imagine that the framers would dictate to the existing state governments how they would appoint and define the tenure of state court judges.
It was difficult enough to secure agreement on the creation of a new federal
judiciary.2 5 Indeed, the compromise that was reached on this score in the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 required the creation of only one federal
court: the Supreme Court. 26 The framers left it up to Congress to decide
2 7
whether any other federal courts would be created. Thus, it was possible
that only one adjudicative body-the Supreme Court-would be protected
by the Independent Adjudicator model. All other adjudication might take
place in state courts (or potentially before other kinds of adjudicators) enjoying variable but in nearly all cases lesser degrees of independence.
Congress of course did create lower federal courts, and in doing so had
to abide by the protections of Article III with respect to the judges named to
those courts. But the jurisdiction of the Article III courts has always been
more limited than allowed by the Constitution's enumeration of the types of
28
cases and controversies that comprise the federal judicial power. For example, the legislature did not give federal courts the authority to exercise original jurisdiction over cases presenting a federal question until 1875.29 Such
limitations have necessarily reduced the potential scope of the Independent
Adjudicator model.
Supreme Court decisions soon reduced the scope of the Independent
Adjudicator model even further. As soon as it was organized, the federal government gained control of a vast amount of territory, most of which was held
3 0
for eventual establishment of additional states. Congress created territorial
judges to serve in these territories, and these judges (because it was assumed
they would eventually be replaced by state court judges) were not given the
life tenure enjoyed by regular federal judges."1 The Supreme Court upheld

25

See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 6-9 (7th ed. 2015) (describing the Constitutional Convention's discussion about the
court system).
26 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
27 id.
28 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

29

Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32

(2012)).
30

See generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968) (recount-

ing the history of American territory and land development).
31 GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION
AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 139-50 (2004).
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this exception to Article 11.32 The federal armed forces were small up until
the Civil War, but they adopted the English practice of using military courts
marshal, composed of military officers who did not enjoy life tenure or secure compensation, to try offenses charged against uniformed personnel.3 3
The Court upheld this as another exception to Article III.34
The Court planted the seeds of what became a more consequential
carve-out from Article III in a decision called Murray 's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co.35 The case involved a corrupt federal tax collector
who had fled to England. 6 In an effort to recover some of the lost funds, the
Treasury Department imposed a lien against some of the tax collector's property. Other creditors challenged the use of an executive tax lien as both a
violation of due process and Article III; but both claims were rejected. The
Court stated that the lien was an example of matters that involve "public
rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable
of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but
which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of
the United States, as it may deem proper."" This statement gave birth to what
commentators and courts have described as the "public rights" exception to
Article 111
The notion of a public rights exception to Article III does not make
sense in terms of the rationale for the Independent Adjudicator model. If
"public rights" refers to cases pitting the government against private actors,
these seemingly are the ones most in need of an independent adjudicator. Alternatively, one could perhaps understand a public rights exception as being
limited to cases involving government grants of land, franchises, or publicassistance benefits. But Murray 's Lessee involved a government effort to
take away property, not to confer it. Over time, largely in bankruptcy cases,
the Court came to understand the public rights exception as covering virtually
everything other than claims of private right grounded in state law, such as
contract and tort claims.39 This too makes little sense. State law claims are
ordinarily adjudicated in state court, where the Independent Adjudicator
model does not apply. The Court's privileging of private rights of contract

32 Am. Ins. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
33

Edmund M. Morgan, The Backgroundofthe Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV.

169, 169 (1953).
34 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858).
35 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
36

For the background of the case, see Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the PoliticalBranches, 107

COLUM. L. REv. 559, 587 (2007), and Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the FederalJudicialPower:
From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 791 (1986).
37

Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.

38

See generally Young, supra note 36.

39

See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488-93 (2011) (tort claim); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-72 (1982) (plurality opinion) (contract claim).
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and tort thus confined the Independent Adjudicator model to the area where
its rationale was arguably weakest, and denied it where it was greatest.40
The most recent expansion of the public rights exception-and corresponding shrinkage of the right to an Article III tribunal-occurred in Oil
41
States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC. The Court
held that previously granted patents can be cancelled by the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), a non-Article III tribunal, subject to deferential review
by an Article III court. The Court acknowledged that it had never "definitively explained" the difference between a public right and a private right,
42
and that its prior decisions had not been "entirely consistent." But it held
that patents are a "public franchise," analogous to a franchise to build a toll
bridge over navigable waters. 43 As such, the Court concluded that patents fall
in the public rights category and can be cancelled by a non-Article III tribunal. Read for all it is worth, Oil States would seem to justify the use of nonArticle III tribunals to hear federal takings of land by eminent domain, since
nearly all land in the United States derives either from colonial charters or
federal land grants, and thus could also be characterized as a "public franchise."44 Alternatively, the Court could easily decide, given the lack of any
clear definition of public rights, that Oil States should be limited to the invention patent context.
The largest and most consequential exception to the Independent Adjudicator model concerns adjudications by administrative agencies. The history
45
of adjudications by administrative agencies is long and complex. When
Congress first created agencies to adjudicate claims under federal law, the
assumption was that such adjudications were subject to de novo review by
an Article III court. 46 Congress grew impatient with the duplication of effort
47
and delay this entailed, and signaled that it wanted the courts to back off.
Eventually, the Supreme Court agreed that Article III courts would give significant deference to fact finding by agency adjudicators, but would review
conclusions of law de novo.48 This, of course, ignored that accurate determinations of fact are often critical to fair and impartial adjudication. But the
retreat of Article III courts to something akin to an appellate review model in
40

Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Deci-

sion, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 210 (1983).

41
42

138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
Id. at 1373 (first quoting N. PipelineConstr. Co., 458 U.S. at 69; then quoting Stern, 564 U.S. at

488).
Id. at 1375.
4 Indeed, the grant of federal public domain land to private claimants was historically denominated
a "patent." See Nelson, supra note 36, at 578.
45 This paragraph draws from Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins
of the Appellate Review Model ofAdministrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 939 (2011).
46 See id at 953-55.
47 See id at 955-59.
48 See id. at 959-65.
43
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administrative cases was well established by 1932, when the Court in Crowell v. Benson49 upheld this reduced role for Article III courts, even in cases
involving private rights."o
Crowell and the emergence of the appellate review model raises the
question of just what it means to say that a case must be heard by an Article
III tribunal. Professor Richard Fallon, among others, has argued that the right
to an Article III tribunal is simply the right to appellate review by an Article
III tribunal.5 This neatly eliminates any conflict between Article III and the
emergence of widespread administrative adjudication-as long as Congress
provides for some form of judicial review. This would appear to be the formula adopted in 1946 by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"): the
agency can decide the facts subject to deferential review by an Article III
court, but the court will decide all questions of law de novo.5 2 This division
of functions effectively mimics the division between trial courts and appellate courts in civil law more generally.
Several decades later, without mentioning the APA, the Court in the
famous Chevron decision" instructed that deferential review is also called
for when agencies resolve unclear questions of law.5 4 This puts agencies in
the driver's seat with respect to both questions of law and questions of fact,
with Article III courts retreating to the function of monitoring agencies for
extreme outcomes that can be characterized as unreasonable."
One might think based on this survey that there is little left of the Independent Adjudicator model, but that is not the case. Article III judges still
regularly hear federal criminal prosecutions and constitutional claims, to the
extent they go to trial. 6 Still, the domain of the Independent Adjudicator
model, which was never even close to complete, has continued to shrivel,

49 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
50

Id. at 50-51, 54. The Court acknowledged that the case involved private rights, and thus the

public rights exception did not apply. Id. at 51. The decision cautioned that "jurisdictional facts" and facts
that undergird constitutional rights must be resolved by Article I courts. Id at 54-63. This limitation fell
by the wayside in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, where the Court held that facts supporting
a claim of constitutional right could be resolved based on the record compiled by an administrative agency.

298 U.S. 38, 53-54 (1936).
51

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., OfLegislative Courts, AdministrativeAgencies, andArticle MI, 101 HARV.

L. REv. 915, 943-49 (1988). For other proponents of the appellate review solution, see Nelson, supranote
36, at 614-20.
52

Compare 5 U.S.C.

§ 706 (2012)

(opening sentence) ("the reviewing court shall decide all relevant

questions of law"), with id. § 706(2)(E) (saying that the reviewing court shall "set aside" agency decisions
"unsupported by substantial evidence").
53 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54 See id. at 842-43.
55

For a powerful argument that Chevron is incompatible with judicial independence by requiring

Article III courts to defer to the views of one of the parties to a dispute, see Philip Hamburger, Chevron

Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1187, 1189 (2016).
56

See Nelson, supra note 36, at 610.

GEO. MASON L. REv.

908

[26:3

reducing its potential to realize the general aspiration for fair and impartial
adjudication.
The Evisceration of the Common Law ProceduresModel

B.

The failure of the Common Law Procedures model has roughly the opposite explanation: It has come about not because of the shrinking of the domain of the model, but because of its expansion.
The Common Law Procedures model worked well enough as long as
government at both the federal and state levels adhered to the three-branch
structure of government embodied in the Constitution-legislature, executive, and judiciary. The legislature was charged with enacting general laws
of prospective application, but under the Due Process Clause it could not
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without a judicial trial that comported with the common-law model.1 7 The executive was charged with bringing enforcement actions and executing judicial judgments, but under the Due
Process Clause it could not seize persons or property without affording the
affected person the right to challenge the action in court." Lastly, the judiciary was charged with resolving disputes under law between adverse parties,
but under the Due Process Clause it had to adhere to the Common Law Procedures model in both form and substance. 9 Exceptions from the model were
permissible if it was possible to find some analogue in common-law practice.
It was on this basis that the Court rejected due process challenges to executive tax liens,6 0 allowed states to commence criminal prosecutions by information rather than indictment,6' and permitted summary action to seize
62
tainted foodstuffs that posed a potential danger to public health.
As in the case of the Independent Adjudicator model, the rise of the
administrative state put the Common Law Procedures model under stress.
There was no decisive moment when the Court held that a hearing by an
administrative agency, as opposed to a common-law court, could satisfy due
process. Early challenges to administrative orders typically sounded in

5

See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separationof Powers, 121

YALE L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012) (discussing this paradox).
58 See id. at 1782, 1789.
59 Thus, for example, sham trials, trials distorted by a mob atmosphere, and confessions obtained
by coercion were all deemed to be inconsistent with the substance of the common-law trial and thus to

violate
Powell
(1923)
60
61
62

due process. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (coerced confession);
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932) (mob influence); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-92
(sham trial).
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320 (1908).
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substantive rather than procedural due process."3 Procedural due process objections were first raised in cases involving state occupational licensing,
which could be characterized as a public right, or workers' compensation
schemes, which could be characterized as voluntary." Eventually, it became
settled that courts would defer to administrative determinations of fact. 65 By
the time administrative hearings were directly challenged as violating procedural due process, the claim was brushed aside on the ground that such hearings had become settled practice.66 Congress subsequently ratified this inversion of the original understanding with the enactment of the APA. 67 Congress
and the Court regarded administrative hearings mandated by the APA as
comporting with due process because the hearings imitated the process that
applied in a common-law court.68 They politely ignored the obvious difference between a common-law trial and an adjudication conducted by a subordinate agency official that imitates a common-law trial.
Two transformative factors interacted to further eviscerate the Common
Law Procedures model as a significant constitutional protection of fair and
impartial adjudication. The first, and probably most important, was a vast
expansion in the types of disputes to which due process applies. The expansion began gradually, in cases involving administrative adjudication of tax
deficiencies, denials of admission to the bar by character and fitness commissions, and administrative terminations of government employment or security clearances. 69 But in 1970, the trickle suddenly became a flood. If there
was a watershed moment when the scope of due process ballooned, it was
the decision in Goldberg v. Kelly. As previously noted, Goldbergadhered to
the Common Law Procedures model insofar as it took the common-law trial

63 E.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897) (involving the
necessity of compensation for land taken by the state for public use); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 441 (1890) (discussing compensation rates for transportation of goods).
64 See, e.g., Booth Fisheries Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Wis., 271 U.S. 208, 211 (1926) (rejecting due
process challenge to administrative commission given final authority to determine workers' compensation

awards because the scheme was elective); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507 (1903) (rejecting due
process challenge to administrative board responsible for issuing physician licenses).
65

See Merrill, supra note 45, at 971.

66 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45-48 (1932); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United
States, 280 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1930).
67

See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.

68

See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-51 (1950) (holding that the APA applies to

immigration deportation hearings in order to cure due process objections to the procedures that otherwise
would apply; thus, implicitly assuming that a hearing that comports with the APA satisfies due process).

69 See, e.g., Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (applying due process analysis to denials of admission to the bar by character and fitness commissions); Cafeteria & Rest.
Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 888-89 (1961) (applying due process analysis to
administrative terminations of government employment or security clearances); Phillips v. Comm'r, 283

U.S. 589, 591-92, 597 (1931) (applying due process analysis to administrative adjudication of tax deficiencies).
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as the model of what due process requires.7 0 The transformative aspect of the
decision was its vast expansion of the range of interests subject to the Due
Process Clauses. Goldberg extended due process protection to welfare benefits, which had previously been regarded as a "privilege" the government was
free to offer or withhold at its discretion. 71 The decision recharacterized welfare payments as "a matter of statutory entitlement." 7 2 A footnote, which was
evidently an afterthought, cited to the scholarship of Professor Charles Reich,
then a professor at Yale, who suggested that such benefits could be regarded
3
as a type of "new property." 7
The Court quickly followed the Goldberg precedent by extending due
process to a wide range of interests previously assumed to be outside the
realm of protection, including a horse trainer's license, 74 public utility services, 75 eligibility for parole,76 and the accumulation of good time credits toward early release from prison.77 Scholars soon labeled the extension of due
process to various government benefits and public employment schemes the
"new property," in homage to Professor Reich. " Similarly, scholars dubbed
the extension to prison and parole regulations the "new liberty," since the
primary liberty of the beneficiaries had been extinguished by their conviction
and sentence. 7 9 The result was very much a revolution. In 1975, Judge Henry
Friendly noted, "we have witnessed a greater expansion of procedural due
process in the last five years than in the entire period since ratification of the
Constitution."o Professor Jerry Mashaw calculated that complaints alleging
procedural due process violations increased by 350% between the 1960s and
the 1970s.8'
The second factor that contributed to the demise of the Common Law
Procedures model was a gradual transformation in the nature of the commonlaw trial itself. When the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
70 See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1267-68 (1975); supra
notes 20-22 and accompanying text.

71

E.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by equally divided Court, 341

U.S. 918, 918 (1951).
72 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
73 Id. at 262 n.8 (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965); and citing Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964)).
74 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979).
75 Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1978).
76 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979).
77 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
78

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty, 86 VA. L. REV. 885,

918 (2000) ("Reich's articles denounced the rights/privileges distinction and urged that 'government lar(quoting Reich, The New
gesse' be recharacterized as constitutionally protected 'new property' .
Property, supra note 73, at 734-39)).
79 See id. at 964 (quotations omitted).
80 Friendly, supra note 70, at 1273.
81

JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 9 (1985).
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Amendments were adopted, the phrase "common-law trial" essentially meant
trial by jury.8 2 Certainly this was true in criminal cases. Civil cases were complicated by the existence of equity and a few other things like executive tax
liens.83 But controversies between the individual and the state were largely
mediated by officer suits sounding in tort, and here too the jury trial reigned
supreme.84 Over time, the common-law trial has been extensively modified,
often by changes designed to enhance the protection of individuals in the
name of due process. Due process has come to mean something more like
"fundamental fairness," and courts have applied this understanding to the requirements of the classic common-law trial in order to make alterations in
the name of fairness." These changes have made jury trials very expensive,
which has resulted in the rise of plea bargains replacing trials in criminal
cases. 6 The procedures of equity, including discovery and motions practice,
were transposed onto civil cases more generally; as a result, civil trials also
became more expensive.8 7 Settlement negotiations and arbitration accordingly expanded to take their place. 8
A moment's reflection will reveal that if the range of interests protected
by due process is radically expanded, and the costs of a conventional common-law trial are dramatically increased, the Common Law Procedures
model will no longer work. It has to be replaced by something else. And indeed, this is what happened.
The coup was administered in Mathews v. Eldridge,89 in which the Court
upheld the statutory scheme for terminating Social Security disability benefits as consistent with due process. The scheme provided for a paper hearing-essentially an exchange of medical reports-prior to termination, with
the possibility of a full adjudicatory hearing imitating a common-law trial
only after termination.90 The case encapsulates the two factors this Article
emphasizes as leading to the demise of the Common Law Procedures model.
The number of disability recipients is huge, and the potential number of termination decisions runs into nearly one million annually. 91 The costs of
82

See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 57, at 1679; Eberle, supra note 17,
at 346-47.

83 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 282 (1856).
84

See generally Ann Woolhandler, Patternsof Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W.

RES. L. REv. 396 (1987) (outlining the history of an officer's breach of legal duty and the remedies available to the harmed).

85

See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1978) (due process as fundamental fairness

requires explicit instruction of presumption of innocence in criminal trial).
86 See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7,
302 (2011).
87 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:An Examinationof Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 477 (2004).

88 See id. at 517.
89

424 U.S. 319 (1976).

90

Id. at 337-39.

91

The Social Security Administration receives over 2 million new disability claims each year and
terminates nearly 900,000 existing claimants. Soc. Sec. Admin., Disabled Worker Beneficiary Statistics
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providing a full adjudicatory hearing before termination would likely swamp
the administrative resources of the Social Security Administration, given the
high percentage of recipients who would demand a hearing before termination, if only to delay the inevitable. The Court responded to this harsh reality
of a commonby adopting a cost-benefit test for determining which features
92 The test requires
context.
given
any
in
process
due
by
law trial are required
courts to select the package of procedures that would reduce the sum of error
9
costs and the costs of administering the system. Applying this test in a backof-the-envelope fashion informed largely by the government's brief, the
Court in Eldridgeconcluded that the combination of a medical review before
termination and an option for a hearing imitating a common-law trial after
termination was constitutional. 94
The new cost-benefit approach to due process rationalized rulings such
as Goss v. Lopez,95 which held that due process required a public school principal, before suspending a student for misconduct for fewer than ten days, to
orally inform the student of the reasons for the suspension and give the stu96
dent a chance "to present his side of the story." Whatever one thinks of the
suggested procedure as a matter of educational policy, it bears only the faintest resemblance to a common-law trial. And inevitably so; it would be completely unworkable to hold a common-law trial before suspending a student
for ten days or less.
Some commentators attacked the holding in Eldridge for treating the
right to a hearing as a purely utilitarian matter and ignoring "dignitary" values.97 But this criticism penetrates only partway into the sea change wrought
by the decision. Before Eldridge, due process was regarded as an individual
right. Every person was guaranteed that they would receive a common-law
trial--or at least something imitating it-before being deprived of life, liberty, or property. Eldridge transformed this individual right into a requirement of social welfare maximization. The decision focused on the welfare of
98
beneficiaries as a group, not the individual beneficiary before the Court.
But even this understates the extent of the transformation. The Court effectively recast due process as a requirement that hearing procedures advance
the social welfare of organized society as a whole.
by Calendar Year, Quarter, and Month, SELECTED DATA FROM SOCIAL SECURITY's DISABILITY
PROGRAM, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/dibStat.htmi (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
92 Eldridge,424 U.S. at 334-35.
93 Id. at 335.
94

See id at 349.

95 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
96 Id. at 581.
97 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, AdministrativeDue Process: The Questfor a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U. L. REV. 885, 885-86 (1981).
98 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 342 (discussing financial interests of disability recipients in general); id. at
346-47 (discussing overall error rates in termination decisions); id. at 347-48 (discussing overall fiscal
and administrative burden on the government likely to be caused by pre-termination hearings).
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It did not take long for a more devastating critique of the Eldridge transformation to appear, delivered most effectively by Judge Frank Easterbrook,
before he became a judge.99 Easterbrook's point was simple: if the objective
is to determine the package of procedures that maximizes social welfare, why
is this a job for judges rather than the legislature? Easterbrook noted the paradox that the Court has given virtually dispositive deference to legislatures
in deciding whether to create welfare schemes and how much to fund them. 100
These are regarded as matters of social policy, as to which the legislature is
assumed to have superior competence and legitimacy. Why then should the
package of procedures for implementing these systems-now assumed by
Eldridge to be a matter of social welfare maximization-be assigned to
judges? As Easterbrook wrote:

'

Substance and process are intimately related. The procedures one uses determine how much
substance is achieved, and by whom. Procedural rules usually are just a measure of how much
the substantive entitlements are worth, of what we are willing to sacrifice to see a given goal
attained. The body that creates a substantive rule is the logical judge of how much should be
spent to avoid errors in the process of disposing of claims to that right.1 0

Although Easterbrook's critique was devastating, the Court (unsurprisingly) did not immediately confess error. The fact remains, however, that the
Court over time has become decidedly more deferential to legislative judgments about appropriate packages of procedures in the context of administrative hearings, a retreat consistent with the Easterbrook critique. 102 For example, in Walters v. NationalAss'n ofRadiation Survivors,03 the Court upheld a statute dating from the Civil War era that prohibited veterans from
paying more than $10 for the services of a lawyer in challenging a decision
by the Veterans Administration. "0 For decades the provision eluded any challenge based on due process, because veterans' benefits were regarded as privileges rather than property. But once Goldberg and its progeny expanded the
domain of property to include government benefits, a due process challenge
was inevitable. The ridiculously low cap on attorney fees would surely run
afoul of the Common Law Procedures model, which included the right to hire
a lawyer of one's choice for an agreed fee in order to do battle with the government. But it passed muster under the Court's application of the Eldridge

100

99

Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 85, 88.
See id.

101

Id. at 112-13.

102

See Thomas W. Merrill, JerryL. Mashaw, The DueProcessRevolution, and the Limits
ofJudicial
Power, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L.

MAsHAw 39, 42-45 (Nicholas Parrillo ed. 2017) (documenting the decline in the Supreme Court's enforcement of procedural due process claims).

103 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
104 Id. at 307-08, 334.
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cost-benefit test.105 Indeed, to this Author's knowledge, the Court has never
invalidated a procedural package adopted by Congress in a "new property"
or "new liberty" type case. Decisions reviewing state administrative procedures have also become much more deferential, although a few decisions
overturning state procedures, often on ambiguous grounds that mix up procedure with substantive disagreement with state policy, do exist. o6
If a calculus designed to maximize social welfare determines the meaning of due process, and legislatures and agencies are better at making determinations of social welfare than courts, then courts should give something
like Chevron deference to legislatures and agencies with respect to the meaning of due process in any given context. Indeed, Professor Adrian Vermeule
has recently argued for just this conclusion. 0 However startling, the conclusion follows logically from the Court's premises. It is also a reasonably fair
characterization of the reality of procedural due process on the ground. The
Common Law Procedures model, if not dead, is surely greatly weakened.
POSSIBILITIES FOR RESTORATION

III.

Is there anything to be done by way of restoring, or at least halting the
decline in, the constitutional strategies for assuring fair and impartial adjudication? In general, there is little room for optimism here. Constitutional reform is supposed to occur through the process of formal amendment, as set
forth in Article V.' 0 This has always been difficult, and appears to be increasingly so, given growing political polarization mirrored by geographic
polarization.109 The de facto method of constitutional change today is revision
10
in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution's text.' This does
not work too well either, given the path-dependent nature of judicial precedent. There have been some spectacular course corrections in the past, such
as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins."' But the general pattern is that early interpretations chart a path, which congeals into a settled practice that the Court
is unwilling to change for fear of undermining the notion that its interpretations are binding on everyone else. There are, however, some interpretative
clarifications that are within the realm of the conceivable, and which might
do something to shore up the constitutional protection of fair and impartial
adjudication. If these interpretations were supplemented by a change in the
105 Id. at 319-26.
106

See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,424,437-38 (1982) (invalidating a state
disability statute that had the effect of terminating claims if not processed in a timely fashion by a state
agency).
107 See Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1930-31 (2016).
108

U.S. CONST. art. V.

Thomas W. Merrill, Interpretingan UnamendableText, 71 VAND. L. REV. 547, 550-51 (2018).
See id. at 552.
It1 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie Railroad, the Court overturned the practice of applying general common law rather than state law in federal diversity jurisdiction cases. Id. at 80.
109
110
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way in which administrative adjudication is conducted, an even more significant step could be taken toward restoring the assurance of fair and impartial
adjudication.
A.

Clarifingthe Public Rights Exception

With respect to the Independent Adjudicator model, the most plausible
interpretative clarification involves the nebulous public rights exception. The
exception has never been clearly defined. In the foundational case, Murray's
Lessee, "public rights" evidently referred to a right of public officials to act
in a way detrimental to particular individuals.11 2 But the more general understanding, reflected in a variety of contexts over time, is that public rights refer
to benefits that the government, in its discretion, can either offer to its citizens
or not.I" Public rights in this sense are contrasted with private rights, which
refer in this context to rights of the type that were recognized at common law
before the adoption of the Constitution and which the Ninth Amendment says
the Constitution does not deny or disparage.11 4 These are, most prominently,
the rights of life, liberty, and property mentioned expressly in the Due Process Clauses."
In order to reinforce the Independent Adjudicator model, the Court
should clarify that the public rights exception to Article III applies only to
discretionary government benefits, such as entitlement programs, subsidy
programs, immigration rights, and government employment. The public
rights exception should not extend to government action intended to take
away private rights of the type recognized prior to the adoption of the Constitution. This would mean that when the federal government seeks to coerce
an individual to relinquish private rights of life, liberty, or property, an Article III court must hear the dispute.
To a large extent, this tracks existing practice. No one has suggestedyet-that an administrative agency can be created to try federal criminal
cases or determine whether the federal government is authorized to take property by eminent domain. Notice, however, that these are coercive governmental actions that predate the rise of the administrative state. Administrative
adjudication has been squared with Article III only by defining down the Article III right to mean something like appellate review." 6 Given the importance of accurate fact-finding in fair and impartial adjudication, this is not
112 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284--85
(1856).
113 See Nelson, supra note 36, at 566-72.
114 U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
115 See Nelson, supra note 36, at 566-67.
116 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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enough. Unfortunately, an interpretational correction is not possible here.
The appellate review model of administrative review, which has been enshrined in the APA for more than seventy years, has too much gravitational
force for judicial interpretation to reverse."' Restoring fair and impartial adjudication in the context of administrative adjudication requires a legislative
fix, as discussed below.
The suggested clarification of the public rights exception is therefore
relatively modest and intended largely as a firewall against further erosion of
the Independent Adjudicator model found in Article III. Absent repudiation
of the appellate review model in administrative law, this clarification would
do nothing to cure growing concerns about fair and impartial adjudication in
the context of administrative adjudication. And it would do nothing to
staunch the rise of plea bargaining as an alternative to adjudication of criminal cases, nor the expansion of binding arbitration as an alternative to civil
trials. These changes, as previously suggested, have been driven largely by
18
the increasing costs of conventional trials.'
Limiting the Cost-Benefit Test

B.

Turning to the Common Law Procedures model, the most plausible interpretive clarification involves the scope of the Eldridge cost-benefit test.
Sometimes the Court has treated Eldridge as a universal test for the adequacy
of hearing procedures; other times it has declined to apply it to proceedings
that have been historically governed by distinct traditions.' 1 9 This suggests
that it is open to the Court to limit Eldridge to the context in which it was
decided-an assessment of the adequacy of the procedures mandated by
Congress for processing administrative benefit claims.
If Eldridge were cabined in this fashion, then two other moves would
open up. With respect to claims governed by Eldridge-thatis, review of the
adequacy of administrative benefit procedures--courts could continue down
the path of giving great deference to the package of procedures adopted by
politically accountable bodies. This is a sensible trend. There is no reason
why the multiplicity of issues processed by administrative agencies in the
implementation of benefit schemes should be assessed against the benchmark
of the common-law trial. For the reasons articulated by Judge Easterbrook,
legislatures and agencies are better situated than courts to specify the packages of procedures that apply in these contexts.

See Merrill, supra note 45, at 1003.
118 See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
119 Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (applying Eldridgeto assess procedures
followed in a habeas corpus proceeding), with Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (declining
to apply Eldridge in assessing a due process challenge to military courts marshal procedures), and Medina
v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (rejecting Eldridge in the context of a due process challenge to
criminal trial procedure).
117
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For other types of due process claims, the test of adequacy should be
based on tradition and settled practice. For criminal trials and ordinary civil
proceedings, the benchmark would be the common-law trial, as it has evolved
to the present day. For military courts marshal, the benchmark would be the
traditions that govern courts marshal, as they have evolved to the present day.
For habeas corpus petitions, the benchmark would be the traditions that govern habeas corpus as they have evolved to the present day, and so forth. In
other words, a Burkean appeal to tradition would give content to due process
of law, not judicial cost-benefit analysis or any other type ofjudicial policymaking.1 20
These interpretive clarifications would shore up the protection afforded
by due process in conventional contexts where the government is acting as
the aggressor seeking to deprive persons of life, liberty, or property. This is
where individuals need fair and impartial adjudication the most, and it is also
where the original understanding of the Due Process Clauses envisioned that
the Common Law Procedures model would apply. It would also bring due
process fully into play in the context of administrative adjudication where an
agency is seeking to impose a civil fine, forfeiture, or obligation to pay reparations. But it would largely disarm due process from playing a significant
role in administrative adjudication designed to determine eligibility for governmental benefits. Here, as elsewhere, tightening the range in which a constitutional right functions may strengthen the degree of protection it affords. 121
C.

Reforming Agency Adjudication

A third reform, which would require new legislation rather than interpretive clarification, concerns the pervasive problem of achieving fairness
and impartiality in the context of administrative agency adjudication. The
problem is often discussed in terms of the procedures for appointing and removing Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs"), who render initial decisions in
administrative adjudication.1 22 But the difficulty runs far deeper. American
administrative agencies, in their original incarnation, were modeled after
common-law courts and were expected to make policy through the process
of case-by-case adjudication.1 23 Some agencies, most notably the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), still proceed in this manner.1 24 Using
120
121

On Burkean interpretation, see Merrill, supra note 109, at 590-99.
As Judge Stephen Williams has observed, expansion of the scope of a right, such as the right of

procedural due process, often leads to dilution in protection of the right. Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and
Property:The ProblemofGovernment Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 13, 17 (1983).
122 See, e.g., Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REv. 797, 832 (2013).
123 See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS

124-25 (2016).
124

Barnett, supra note 122, at 816.

121,
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individual cases to make policy is fundamentally incompatible with resolving
cases in a fair and impartial manner. Making policy through adjudication entails retroactive lawmaking; fair and impartial adjudication generally entails
applying settled legal rules to disputed facts.
The assumption that agencies will make policy through adjudication is
embedded in the APA.1 25 Thus, the APA provides that adjudicatory decisions
by ALJs are subject to plenary review by agency heads, and contemplates
that agency heads, if they so desire, can decide contested disputes themselves, bypassing ALJs altogether. 12 6 Yet the prospect of review and reversal
by agency heads is the principal reason why ALJ adjudication is not fair and
impartial. Agency ALJs, like other adjudicators, are averse to having their
decisions overturned. 1 27 Consequently, they trim their findings of fact and
conclusions of law in ways that correspond to the preferences of the political
heads of the agencies that employ them.1 28 Tinkering with the method of appointing and removing ALJs cannot solve the AU bias problem. The only
solution to this particular threat to fair and impartial adjudication is to get
administrative agencies out of the business of resolving disputes under law
altogether-including disputes under agency-made law.
In searching for an appropriate alternative to the current APA system of
adjudication, one should keep several objectives in mind. One is the desirability of preserving the characteristics of agency adjudication that led the
framers of the APA to endorse the use of ALJs for these purposes in the first
place. These are, most importantly, the benefits of using an adjudicator who
has expertise in a particular field, and relatedly, the ability to use more informal and expeditious procedures than those that characterize the modern civil
trial. It is also important to satisfy the constitutional constraints imposed by
29
the Appointments Clause and the limits on removal authority.1 Finally, and
most pertinently, it is imperative to devise a system that is more likely to
generate fair and impartial outcomes that are not systematically biased in favor of the policy preferences of the incumbent political appointees who run
the agencies.
Commentators have proposed various alternatives to the current system
of AU adjudication. One obvious solution would be to expand the ranks of
125 Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-57 (2012) (prescribing elaborate provisions governing adjudication),
with id. § 553 (prescribing bare-bones provisions governing rulemaking).
126 See id § 556(b) (providing that the agency or one or more members of the body that comprises
the agency may preside at the taking of evidence); id § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial
decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may

&

limit the issues on notice or by rule.").
127 On the general aversion of adjudicators to being reversed, see Stephen J. Choi et al., What Do
FederalDistrictJudges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. ECON.
ORG. 518, 518-19 (2011).
128 See David Zaring, EnforcementDiscretion at the SEC, 94 TEx. L. REV. 1155, 1183 (2016) (concluding that SEC ALJs rule in favor of the agency a very high percentage of the time).
129 See Barnett, supra note 122, at 836-37.
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the Article III courts sufficiently to permit all agency adjudication to be transferred to courts that are truly independent. However, this idea has been consistently opposed on the ground that it would dilute the prestige of the Article
III courts and, perhaps more seriously, would create an enormous and unwieldy federal judiciary.13 0
A more promising solution would be to replace ALJs with independent
adjudicators modeled on "Article I" courts like the Tax Court, the Bankruptcy Court, and the Court of Federal Claims. These Article I judges obviously specialize in a particular field, suggesting that additional specialized
Article I courts could be created corresponding to particular federal agencies
like the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the PTO. In their
current incarnations, Article I courts generally hew to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, but there is no reason why they could not be authorized to
experiment with more informal or streamlined procedures, analogous to
those followed by current ALJs. Article I judges are typically appointed for
fixed terms of fourteen or fifteen years, in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause, and are protected from dismissal except for good cause.'"
Different modes of appointment are possible, although having appointments
made by federal courts of appeals, as in the case of bankruptcy judges, would
likely result in high-quality judges. Having the courts of appeals make the
appointments, and assigning these courts the responsibility of determining
whether removal is warranted for causes, would also assure a very high degree of independence for these Article I adjudicators, approaching that associated with Article III judges. As in the case of the Tax Court, the Bankruptcy
Court, and the Court of Federal Claims, Article III courts should review the
decisions of these Article I judges under the appellate review model. The
current practice of subjecting decisions by ALJs to review by the agency in
which they work should be eliminated. This is the only way to provide assurance that the new Article I judges would resolve individual disputes in a fair
and impartial manner.
This proposal has fairly significant implications for the structure of the
administrative state. It would effectively end the practice of having agencies
make policy through adjudication. Agencies would have to make policy by
rulemaking and the issuance of policy statements, interpretive rules, and
guidelines. There is of course a strong trend in this direction in any event,
with more modern agencies, like the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), relying almost exclusively on these sorts of regulatory tools rather
than adjudication. But older agencies, like the NLRB and the Federal Trade
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Commission, would have to give up the practice of using adjudication to formulate policy. This proposal would also necessarily override the Chenery
doctrine, which allows agencies to choose between rulemaking and adjudication in making policy.132
The costs of this proposal, in terms of diminished regulatory flexibility,
would in this Author's opinion be more than outweighed by the benefits in
terms of enhanced fairness and impartiality of this form of adjudication. Nevertheless, it would probably be prudent to phase in any such reform, perhaps
by limiting it initially to agencies that use adjudication primarily to determine
liability for civil fines, forfeitures, or reparations, such as the SEC, the PTO,
and the EPA. For the time being, ALJs and administrative judges should continue making decisions about eligibility for federal benefits like Social Security disability, awaiting the results of experimentation with the new Article I
court approach in select contexts.
D.

Mutually Reinforcing Changes

Notice that the forgoing proposals have a mutually reinforcing effect.
The proposed clarification of the public rights exception would mean that an
Article III tribunal, protected by the Independent Adjudicator model, would
hear challenges to federal actions that impinge on or abridge conventional
rights of life, liberty, or property. The proposed limitation on the application
of the Eldridge doctrine would mean that any form of adjudication, state or
federal, that takes the form of an established type of judicial proceeding must
conform to the Common Law Procedures model, as defined by the evolved
traditions that govern such a form of action. Enacting the proposed statutory
reform that would replace ALJs with Article I courts would mean that federal
administrative adjudication would partake in a degree of independence analogous to that of Article III judges. This, however, would leave much uncovered-most prominently all federal and state administrative adjudication that
involves benefit schemes.
Nevertheless, even if courts can shore up the Independent Adjudicator
model and the Common Law Procedures model in the manner suggested, and
even if ALJs are replaced by Article I judges, these reforms would still leave
the dominant forms of adjudication that exist today-plea bargaining, settlement negotiations, informal adjudication, and arbitration-untouched.
Whether the thousands of adjudications that take place in these contexts
every day are fair and impartial depends entirely on the social norms that
govern the individual adjudicators who operate in these contexts. Those individual adjudicators are typically lawyers, to be sure, but their behavior is
not subject to the constraints associated with the Independent Adjudicator
and Common Law Procedures models. Social norms, including lawyerly
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norms, are inherently fragile and can change rapidly. Perhaps the best that
can be hoped for is a shoring up of constitutional understandings that apply
in a shrinking set of circumstances, supplemented by some needed legislative
reform. A more secure sense of the strategies for assuring fair and impartial
adjudication may help strengthen, if only by example, the social norms on
which society is now utterly dependent in an increasing portion of dispute
resolution.
CONCLUSION
While the two constitutional strategies for assuring fair and impartial
adjudication provided an auspicious beginning, over time each has failed to
sustain this objective, which is central to the rule of law. The domain of the
Independent Adjudicator model has shrunk significantly, as evidenced by
territorial judges and military courts marshal, the public rights exception, and
the emergence of agency adjudication subject only to deferential review by
Article III courts. This has reduced the model's potential to realize the aspiration for fair and impartial adjudication. While this Article does not advocate a comprehensive fix, the proposed clarification of the public rights exception would at least restore some of the role of federal courts in providing
fair and impartial adjudication.
The cost-benefit test that emerged in response to overextension of procedural due process has effectively recast the Common Law Procedures
model as a requirement that hearing procedures advance general social welfare. This is not what the original constitutional strategy was designed to do.
Limiting the cost-benefit test to due process challenges to administrative
benefit schemes would restore some of the original purpose of the Due Process Clauses by ensuring that the government must use established judicial
procedures when it seeks to take life, liberty, or property.
Perhaps the most important reform would be to change the job description of federal administrative agencies from adjudication to policymaking. If
administrative adjudication is to be fair and impartial, it should be given to
truly independent adjudicators, such as Article I courts, which are not subject
to review and reversal by agency political appointees.

